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Abstrat In the paper authors present a new approah to determination
and omputation of a solution for dierential games with presribed dura-
tion in the ase when players lak ertain information about the dynamial
system and payo funtion on the whole time interval on whih the game
is played. At eah time instant players reeive information about dynami-
al system and payo funtions, however the duration of the period of this
information is unknown and an be represented as a random variable with
known parameters. At ertain periods of time the information is updated.
A novel solution is desribed as a ombination of imputation sets in the
trunated subgames that are analyzed using Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon. A resoure extration game serves as an illustration
in order to ompare a ooperative trajetory, imputations, and imputation
distribution proedure in the game with Looking Forward Approah and
in the original game with presribed duration. Looking Forward Approah
is used for onstruting game theoretial models and dening solutions for
onit-ontrolled proesses where information about the proess updates
dynamially.
Keywords: dierential games; time-onsisteny; preditive ontrol.
1. Introdution
The ooperative dierential game theory oers soially onvenient and group
eient solutions to dierent deision problems involving strategi ations. One of
the fundamental elements in this theory is the formulation of optimal behavior for
players or eonomi agents. A design of ooperative strategy and the orresponding
payo, the manner to distribute the payo between players, and the time onsisteny
of the orresponding solution an be onsidered as main problems of this theory.
Haurie analyzed the problem of dynami instability of Nash bargaining solutions
in dierential games (Haurie, 1976). The notion of time onsisteny of dierential
game solutions was formalized mathematially by Petrosyan (Petrosyan, 1977). In
the present researh we examine a speial ase of ooperative dierential games
in whih the game struture an hange or update with time (time-dependent for-
mulation) and assume that the players do not have information about the hange
of the game struture on the full time interval, but they have ertain information
⋆
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about the game struture on the trunated time interval. However, the duration
of this interval is unknown and it is supposed to be a random variable, so that
the players only know the distribution parameters. Under the information about
the game struture we understand information about the dynamial system and
payo funtions. The interpretation an be given as follows: players have ertain
information about the game struture, but the duration of the period when this
information is orret is unknown in advane. Evidently, this trunated informa-
tion is valid only for ertain time and has to be updated. In order to dene the
best possible behavior for players in this type of ooperative dierential game, it is
needed to develop a speial approah, whih we all the Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon. The approah brings up the following points: how to dene a
ooperative trajetory, how to dene a ooperative solution and alloate the oop-
erative payo, and what properties the obtained solution will have. The objet of
this paper is to answer the stated questions. Oered solution is based on the IDP-
ore introdued in (Petrosian et al., 2016), it is built up using the partiular lass
of imputation distribution proedures (IDP) (Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979). It is
demonstrated that newly built solution is not only time-onsistent (whih is a very
rare event in the ooperative dierential games), but also strong time-onsistent.
The onept of the Looking Forward Approah is new in game theory espeially
in ooperative dierential games and gives the foundation for further study of dif-
ferential games with dynami updating. At the moment there are pratially no
results in onstruting approahes for modeling onit-ontrolled proesses where
information about the proess updates in time. In the present work we examine the
Looking Forward Approah with random horizon whih is one of the variations of
Looking Forward Approah introdued in (Petrosian, 2016a). There we supposed
that the duration of trunated information is a xed value. To get more informa-
tion about the approah one may read the following papers: (Petrosian et al., 2017;
Yeung and Petrosian 2017; Gromova and Petrosian, 2016; Petrosian, 2016a; Petro-
sian, 2016b; Petrosian and Barabanov, 2017; Petrosian et al., 2019; Petrosian and
Kuhkarov, 2019). In paper (Petrosian, 2016a) the Looking Forward Approah was
applied to the ooperative dierential game with nite horizon. The notion of trun-
ated subgame, proedure for dening optimal strategies, onditionally ooperative
trajetory and solution onept, and solution property of ∆t-time onsisteny for a
xed information horizon were determined. The paper (Petrosian and Barabanov,
2017) was foused on studying of Looking Forward Approah with stohasti fore-
ast and dynami adaptation in ase when information about the oniting pro-
ess an hange during the game. In the papers (Gromova and Petrosian, 2016)
the Looking Forward Approah was applied to a ooperative dierential game of
pollution ontrol. The aim of the paper was to study dependeny of the resulting
solution upon the value of information horizon, orresponding optimization problem
was formulated and solved. The paper (Petrosian et al., 2017) is devoted to apply
the Looking Forward Approah to the game model of oil market. Further papers
on this subjet are to be published in near future. In the paper (Petrosian, 2016b)
the Looking Forward Approah was applied to the ooperative dierential game
with innite horizon. The paper (Yeung and Petrosian 2017) is devoted to study
the Looking Forward Approah for dynami non-ooperative games. Speial type
of Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equations are derived for a dierent information stru-
tures available to the players during the game. Another interesting lass of games
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is onneted to the lass of dierential games with ontinuous updating was onsid-
ered in the papers (Petrosian and Tur, 2019; Kuhkarov and Petrosian, 2019), here
it is supposed that the updating proess evolves ontinuously in time. In the paper
(Petrosian and Tur, 2019), the system of Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equations are
derived for the Nash equilibrium in a game with ontinuous updating. In the pa-
per (Kuhkarov and Petrosian, 2019) the lass of linear-quadrati dierential games
with ontinuous updating is onsidered and the expliit form of the Nash equilibrium
is derived.
In the artile we use speial form of Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equation for dif-
ferential games with random horizon presented in (Shevkoplyas, 2011; Shevkoplyas,
2014; Petrosjan and Shevkoplyas, 2003). A harateristi funtion of a oalition is
an essential onept in the theory of dierential games. This funtion is dened as
indiated in (Chander and Tulkens, 1995) as total payo of players from oalition S
in Nash equilibrium in the game with following set of players: oalition S (ating as
one player) and players from the set N \S. A omputation of Nash equilibrium fully
desribed in (Basar and Olsder, 1995) is neessary for this approah. A set of impu-
tations or a solution of the game is determined by the harateristi funtion at the
beginning of eah subinterval. For any set of imputations the imputation distribution
proedure (IDP) rst introdued by L. Petrosyan in (Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979)
is analysed. See reent publiations on this topi in (Petrosyan and Yeung, 2006;
Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999; Jorgensen et al., 2003). In order to determine a solu-
tion for the whole game it is required to ombine partial solutions and their IDP
on subintervals. The harateristis of time onsisteny and strong time onsisteny
introdued by L. Petrosyan in (Petrosjan, 1993) and (Petrosyan, 1977) are also ex-
amined for the oered solution.
Looking Forward Approah has similarities with the Model Preditive Con-
trol theory worked out within the framework of numerial optimal ontrol. We
analyze (Goodwin et al., 2005; Rawlings and Mayne, 2009; Wang, 2005; Kwon and
Han, 2005) to get reent results in this area. Model preditive ontrol is a method
of ontrol when the urrent ontrol ation is ahieved by solving at eah sampling
instant a nite horizon open-loop optimal ontrol problem using the urrent state
of an objet as the initial state. This type of ontrol is able to ope with hard
limitations on ontrols and states, whih is denitely its strong point over the rest
of the methods. It has got, therefore, a wide appliation in petro-hemial and re-
lated industries where key operating points are loated lose to the set of admissible
states and ontrols. The main problem that is solved in Model Preditive Control
is the provision of movement along the target trajetory under the onditions of
random perturbations and unknown dynamial system. At eah time step the op-
timal ontrol problem is solved for dening ontrols whih will lead system to the
target trajetory. Looking Forward Approah on the other hand solves the problem
of modeling players behavior when information about the proess updates dynami-
ally. It means that Looking Forward Approah does not use target trajetory, but
answers the question of omposing trajetory whih will be used by players, as well
as the question of alloating ooperative payo along the omposed trajetory.
To demonstrate the Looking Forward Approah we present the example of o-
operative resoure extration game with nite horizon. The original example was
introdued by David Yeung and Steen Jorgensen in (Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999),
the problem of time onsisteny in this game was examined by David Yeung in
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(Yeung and Petrosyan, 2012). In the artile, we analyze three player resoure ex-
tration game with IDP-ore desribed in (Petrosian et al., 2016) used as a oop-
erative solution. We present both analytial and numerial solutions for spei
parameters. The omparison between the original approah and the Looking For-
ward Approah with random horizon is presented. In the nal part of the example
model we demonstrate the strong time onsisteny property of the onstruted solu-
tion. The struture of the artile is as follows. The basi game models are presented
in Setion 2. A sequene of the auxiliary random trunated subgames is determined
in Setion 3. Solutions to these subgames are oered in Setion 4. It involves a oop-
erative behavior of players for the whole game and an alloation of the ooperative
payo between the players at eah stage of the game. In Setion 5 we present a new
onept of the game solution for the ase of updating information. The time onsis-
teny and strong time-onsisteny properties of the solution are stated and proved.
In Setion 6 the Looking Forward Approah is applied to the game of Cooperative
Resoure Extration with nite horizon.
2. The Original Game
The n-person dierential game Γ (x0, T − t0) with nite horizon T − t0, with
the initial state x0 ∈ Rm and initial time instant t0 is given (t0 and T are a xed
values). The struture of the game is dened by the following dynamial system:
ẋ = g(t, x, u), x(t0) = x0, (1)
where x takes values in Rm, u = (u1, . . . , un). Denote the set of players by N =
{1, . . . , n}. A player i hooses a ontrol ui for i = 1, . . . , n. For eah time instant
t, ui(t) ∈ Ui ⊂ CompRk. When the open-loop strategies are used, we require
pieewise ontinuity with nite number of breaks. For feedbak strategies we follow
(Basar and Olsder, 1995). We require that for any n-tuple of strategies u(t, x) =
(u1(t, x), . . . , un(t, x)) the solution of Cauhy problem exists and is unique on the
time interval [t0, T ]. For more sophistiated denition of feedbak strategies in zero-
sum dierential game see (Krasovskii and Kotel'nikova, 2010).
The payo funtion of the player i is desribed as




where x(τ) is the trajetory (the solution) of the system (11) with the ontrol input
u = (u1, . . . , un).
3. Random Trunated Subgame
Suppose information for players is updated at xed time instants t = t0 + j∆t,
j = 0, . . . , l, where t0 < ∆t < T , l =
T−t0
∆t − 1. During the time interval [t0 +
j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t], players have full information about the dynamis of the game
desribed by g(t, x, u) and payo funtion desribed by hi(x(t), u(t)). The problem
is that the players are not sure about the period of time when this information is
valid, all they know is that it is dened on the time interval [t0 + j∆t, T j ], where
duration T j is a random variable with known harateristis. Realization of random
variable T j we denote as tj , j = 0, . . . , l.
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As was mentioned before during the time interval [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t]
players have full information about the dynamis of the game and payo funtion
on the time interval [t0+j∆t, T j ], where T j is a random variable whih takes values
from the time interval [max(t0 +(j+1)∆t, tj−1), T ], tj−1 is a realization of random
variable T j−1 (T j−1 is realized at the time instant t = t0+j∆t). At the time instant
t = t0 + (j + 1)∆t the information about the game is being updated and random
variable T j is realized, i.e. tj beomes known to players. On the next time interval
(t0+(j+1)∆t, t0+(j+2)∆t] players have full information about the game struture
on the time interval (t0 + (j + 1)∆t, T j+1], where T j+1 is a random variable whih
takes values from the time interval [max(t0+(j+2)∆t, tj), T ]. For j = 0 we suppose
that tj−1 = 0.
It may remain unlear why the random variable T j is realized at time instants
t = t0 +(j+1)∆t, but its value tj exeeds t = t0 +(j +1)∆t. Interpretation an be
the following. Suppose that at time instants t = t0 + j∆t players reeive informa-
tion about the game, but in order to aurately estimate the duration of information
horizon whih is random variable T j they need time ∆t (to make alulations et.).
At the time instant t = t0 + (j +1)∆t alulations are performed and ertain value
of information horizon T j beomes known to players, i.e. tj . Another interpretation
is that during urrent ∆t-time interval [t0+j∆t, t0+(j+1)∆t] players reeive addi-
tional information whih helps them to estimate the time on whih the information
about the proess is ertain, i.e. dene the value of information horizon tj . At the
time instant t = t0+(j+1)∆t after the estimation is performed players reeive new
information about the game struture with random information horizon T j+1 and
the same proedure ontinues.
To model this kind of situation we introdue the following denition (Fig. 1).
Denote vetor xj,0 = x(t0 + j∆t).
Fig. 1. Eah oval represents random trunated information, whih is known to players
during the time interval [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l.
Denition 1. Let j = 0, . . . , l. A random trunated subgame Γ̄j(xj,0, t0+j∆t) is
dened on the time interval [t0+j∆t, T j ], where T j is a random variable whih takes
values from the time interval [max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1), T ], tj−1 is a realization of
random horizon T j−1 in the previous trunated subgame Γ̄j−1(xj−1,0, t0+(j−1)∆t).
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Realization of T j−1 ours at time instant t = t0 + j∆t. The dynamial system and
the payo funtion on the time interval [t0 + j∆t, T j ] oinide with that of the
game Γ (x0, T − t0) on the same time interval. The dynamial system and the initial
ondition of the trunated subgame Γ̄j(xj,0, t0 + j∆t) have the following form:
ẋ = g(t, x, u), x(t0 + j∆t) = xj,0. (3)
The payo funtion of player i in random trunated subgame j is equal to





hi (x(τ), u(τ))dτdFj (t), (4)






dFj(t) = 1, (5)
due to the denition, Fj(t) is a onditional distribution funtion, i.e. Fj(t) =
Fj(t | T j−1 = tj−1). Further by notation Fj(t) we will refer to Fj(t | T j−1 = tj−1).
Suppose that the realization of random horizon T j−1 in the game Γ̄j−1(xj−1,0,
t0 + (j − 1)∆t) exeeds time t = t0 + (j + 1)∆t:
tj−1 > t0 + (j + 1)∆t, (6)
then the random horizon T j must exeed the realization of T j−1, beause the in-
formation about the game struture is already known on the time interval [t0 +
j∆t, tj−1]. That is why in the formula (5) the probability of T j taking values from
time interval [t0 + j∆t, tj−1] equals zero:
max(t0+(j+1)∆t,tj−1)∫
t0+j∆t
dFj(t) = 0. (7)
In the papers on the topi of ooperative dierential games with random hori-
zon (Shevkoplyas, 2009; Shevkoplyas, 2010; Shevkoplyas, 2011; Shevkoplyas, 2014;
Petrosjan and Shevkoplyas, 2003) the distribution funtion of T j is dened on the
innite time interval. In this paper T j takes values from the nite time interval
beause the original game is dened on the nite time interval [t0, T ].
In (Kostyunin and Shevkoplyas, 2011) the order of integration in the double
integral (4) was hanged aording to Tonelli's theorem:
Kji (xj,0, t0 + j∆t;u) =
T∫
t0+j∆t
(1− Fj(τ))hi(x(τ), u(τ))dτ. (8)
3.1. Solution of Random Trunated Cooperative Subgame
Consider a trunated ooperative subgame Γ̄ cj (xj,0, t0 + j∆t) dened on the
time interval [t0 + j∆t, T j ] with the initial ondition x(t0 + j∆t) = xj,0, where T j
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Fig. 2. Behavior of players in the game with random trunated information an be modeled
using the random trunated subgames Γ̄j(xj,0, t0 + j∆t), j = 0, . . . , l.
is a random variable with distribution funtion (5). Classially on the rst step of
ooperative dierential games we dene ooperative strategies and orresponding
ooperative trajetory. On the seond step we dene the rule for alloating oopera-
tive payo between the players along the ooperative trajetory. To do this we dene
harateristi funtion and orresponding ooperative solution. The total payo of
players to be maximized in this game is
∑
i∈N







hi(x(τ), u(τ))dτdFj (t) (9)
subjet to
ẋ = g(t, x, u), x(t0 + j∆t) = xj,0. (10)
This is an optimal ontrol problem. Suient onditions for the solution and the
optimal feedbak are given by the Theorem 1 rstly presented in (Shevkoplyas, 2014).
Denote the maximum value of joint payo of the players (9) by the funtion
W (j∆t)(t, x):








where x, t are the initial state and time of subgame of random trunated game
orrespondingly and U = U1 × . . .× Un.
Theorem 1. Assume there exists a ontinuously dierential funtionW (j∆t)(t, x) :
[t0 + j∆t, T j ]×Rm → R satisfying the partial dierential equation
fj(t)
1− Fj(t)
W (j∆t)(t, x) =
W
(j∆t)





hi(t, x, u) +W
(j∆t)
x (t, x)g(t, x, u)
}
, (12)
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where lim
t→T−
W (j∆t)(t, x) = 0, fj(t) is a probability density funtion for random
variable T j (5). Assume that maximum in (12) is ahieved under ontrols u
∗
j (t, x).
Then u∗j (t, x) is optimal in the ontrol problem dened by (9), (10).
Theorem 1 (presented in (Shevkoplyas, 2014)) requires that the funtionW (j∆t)
be C1. However, it is possible to assume only ontinuity onsidering visosity-
solutions using Subbotin approah (Subbotin, 1984; Subbotin, 1995). But due to
the shortage of spae, it is not possible to properly introdue and dene this solu-
tion in the paper. In the example model we dene and get solution W (j∆t) from
C1.
3.2. Conditionally Cooperative Trajetory
During the game Γ (x0, T − t0) players posses only trunated information about
its struture. Obviously, it is not enough to onstrut optimal ontrol and orre-
sponding trajetory for the game Γ (x0, T − t0). As a ooperative trajetory in the
game Γ (x0, T − t0) we propose to use a onditionally ooperative trajetory dened
in the following way:
Denition 2. Conditionally ooperative trajetory {x̂∗(t)}Tt=t0 is dened as a
omposition of ooperative trajetories x∗j (t) in the trunated ooperative subgames
Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j−1(t0 + j∆t), t0 + j∆t) dened on the suessive time intervals [t0 + j∆t, t0 +





x∗0(t), t ∈ [t0, t0 +∆t),
. . . ,
x∗j (t), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t),
. . . ,
x∗l (t), t ∈ [t0 + l∆t, t0 + (l + 1)∆t],
(13)
On the time interval [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t] onditionally ooperative traje-
tory oinides with the ooperative trajetory x∗j (t) in the trunated ooperative
subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j−1(t0 + j∆t), t0 + j∆t). At the time instant t = t0 + (j + 1)∆t in-
formation about the game struture updates in the position x∗j (t0 + (j +1)∆t). On
the time interval (t0 + (j + 1)∆t, t0 + (j + 2)∆t] trajetory x̂
∗(t) oinides with





(j+1)∆t), t0 +(j+1)∆t) whih starts at the time instant t = t0 +(j+1)∆t in the
position x∗j (t0 + (j + 1)∆t). For j = 0: x
∗
j−1(t0 + j∆t) = x0.
3.3. Charateristi Funtion
For eah oalition S ⊂ N and j = 0, . . . , l dene the values of harateristi
funtion as it was done in (Chander and Tulkens, 1995):
Vj(S;x
∗








j,0, t0 + j∆t;u
∗
j ), S = N,
Ṽj(S, x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t), S ⊂ N,




j,0, t0 + j∆t) is dened as total payo of players from oalition S
in Nash equilibrium uNEj = (u
NE,j
1 , . . . , u
NE,j
n ) in the game with following set of
players: oalition S (ating as one player) and players from the set N \S, i.e. in the
game with |N \ S|+ 1 players.
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Fig. 3. Solid line represents the onditionally ooperative trajetory {x̂∗(t)}Tt=t0 . Dashed
lines represent parts of ooperative trajetories that are not used in the omposition, i.e.,
eah dashed trajetory is no longer optimal in the urrent random trunated subgame.
An imputation ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0+j∆t) for eah random trunated ooperative subgame
Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) is dened as an arbitrary vetor whih satises the onditions
ξji (x
∗




j,0, t0 + j∆t) = Vj(N, x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t). (15)
Denote the set of all possible imputations for random trunated subgame by
Ej(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t). As an optimality priniple or solution
Wj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) ⊂ Ej(x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t) (16)
in eah random trunated ooperative subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) we use IDP-ore
introdued in (Petrosian et al., 2016). Constrution of this solution is based upon
the speial lass of IDP (Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979).
Denition 3. Funtion βj(t, x
∗
j ), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T j ] is alled Imputation Distri-
bution Proedure for imputation ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) ∈ Ej(x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t), if
ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) =
∫ T
t0+j∆t
(1− Fj(τ))βj(t, x∗j (t))dτ. (17)
Using IDP βj(t, x
∗
j ) it is possible to dene the rule for alloating imputation ξj(x
∗
j,0,
t0 + j∆t) on the time interval [t0 + j∆t, T j ], where T j is a random variable. It is
obvious that the number of funtions βj(t, x
∗
j (t)) that satisfy the equation (17) is
innite, i.e. the ways of alloation of ooperative payo between players is innite,
but aording to the formula for a lass of games with random horizons presented













j (t), t) (18)
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to dene the unique βj(t, x
∗
j (t)) that ensures the time onsisteny property (Pet-
rosyan and Danilov, 1979) of the imputation ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0+j∆t) or ooperative solution
Wj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) (in ase of multiple priniple of optimality):
Denition 4. Solution Wj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) (ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t)) is alled time-
onsistent if for any imputation ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) ∈ Wj(x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t) exists IDP
βj(t, x
∗
j ) whih ∀t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ] satises:
{∫ T
t
(1− Fj(t))βji (τ, x∗j )dτ
}
∈
W (x∗j (t), t)
({∫ T
t








In the paper we used the approah proposed in (Petrosian et al., 2016) in whih
we onstruted funtions that an be used as IDPs for some imputations and then
omposed orresponding solutions. Suppose that harateristi funtion Vj(S;x
∗
j (t), t),
S ⊂ N is ontinuously dierentiable by t, t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ] along the ooperative
trajetory x∗j (t). Introdue the following notation:
Uj(S;x
∗





j (t), t), (19)
where t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ] and S ⊆ N .
Dene Bj(t, x
∗
j ) as a set of integrable vetor funtions βj(t, x
∗
























j ) = Uj(N, x
∗
j (t), t), ∀S ⊂ N
}
. (20)
Suppose that Bj(t, x
∗
j ) 6= ∅, ∀t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ], j = 0, . . . , l. Then using the set
Bj(t, x
∗
j ) it is possible to dene the following set of vetors:
Denition 5. Set of all possible vetors ξj(x
∗
j (t), t) for some integrable seletors
βj(t, x
∗
j ) ∈ Bj(t, x∗j ) we shall all IDP-ore and denote as Cj(x∗j (t), t), where
Cj(x
∗




j (t), t), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ]
}
(21)
and for t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ]
ξj(x
∗
j (t), t) =
T∫
t
(1 − Fj(τ))βj(τ, x∗j )dτ. (22)
In (Petrosian et al., 2016) it was proved that IDP-ore is a subset of Core:
Theorem 2. The set Cj(x
∗(t), t) is a subset of Core Cj(x
∗(t), t) in random oop-
erative trunated subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j (t), t), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ].
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Core is a lassial solution in the theory of games (Shapley, 1952). In our ase
Core Cj(x
∗(t), t) for eah random trunated subgame is dened as a set of im-
putations ξj(x
∗








j,0, t0 + j∆t)) satisfying














j (t), t) ≥ Vj(S;x∗j (t), t), ∀S ⊂ N .
The main result of paper (Petrosian et al., 2016) is the proof that IDP-ore is
strong time onsistent in dierential games with presribed duration. The same
result an be obtained for random trunated subgame.
Denition 6. Set Wj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) is alled strong time-onsistent if for any





j (t), t) 6= ∅, ∀t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ]
2. for eah imputation ξj(x
∗
j (t), t) ∈ Wj(x∗j (t), t) exists IDP βj(τ, x∗j ) =
(βj1(τ, x
∗




j )), τ ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ], suh that
ξj(x
∗
j (t), t) =
∫ T
t




(1− Fj(τ))βj(τ, x∗j )dτ ⊕Wj(x∗j (t), t) ⊂Wj(x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t) (24)
for eah t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ],
⊕: a⊕B = {a+ b : b ∈ B}, a ∈ Rn, B ⊂ Rn.
Strong time onsisteny of solution means that the solution obtained by "op-
timal" reonsidering initial solution at any time instant during the game will be-
long to the initial solution. Partiularly for IDP-ore in random trunated sub-
game it means that for eah ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) from Cj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) deviation
from this imputation along the ooperative trajetory x∗j (t) in any moment t ∈
[t0 + j∆t, T j ] to any other imputation in urrent IDP-ore ξj(x
∗
j (t), t) ∈ Cj(x∗j , t)
leads to the imputation whih belongs to the initial IDP-ore Cj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t). In
paper (Petrosian et al., 2016) is the proof that IDP-ore is strong time onsistent:
Theorem 3. Suppose Cj(x
∗
j (t), t) 6= ∅, ∀t ∈ [t0+ j∆t, T ]. Then IDP-ore Cj(x∗j,0,




j,0, t0 + j∆t).
In the paper (Petrosian et al., 2016) the properties of the IDP-ore as a ooper-
ative solution are disussed and the tehni for its onstrution is demonstrated on
the linear quadrati game model of pollution ontrol.
It is easy to suggest that distribution of the total payo of players in the game
Γ (x0, T − t0) along the onditionally ooperative trajetory {x̂∗(t)}Tt=t0 an be or-
ganized as a omposition of IDPs for eah time interval [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t],
j = 0, . . . , l, in aordane with the struture of the game Γ (x0, T − t0). This will
be formalized in this setion as a new solution onept.
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The family of setsWj(x
∗
j,0, t0+j∆t) = Cj(x
∗
j,0, t0+j∆t) do not ompose diretly
a solution for the game Γ (x0, T − t0). For any j = 0, . . . , l the optimal solution for
the trunated subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0+j∆t) is dened on the time interval [t0+j∆t, t0+
j∆t+T j ]. This partiular solution makes sense on the interval [t0+j∆t, t0+(j+1)∆t]
only, beause the information about the game struture updates after every∆t time
interval and it is irrelevant to use a solution whih is based upon the outdated
information. The neessary information an be extrated by using the IDP for eah
trunated subgame. Therefore in order to onstrut optimal solution for the whole
game Γ (x0, T − t0) we use the set of IDPs Bj(t) instead of set of imputations
Cj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t).
4. Conept of Solution
In order to introdue a solution onept for the dierential game Γ (x0, T − t0)
with Looking Forward Approah we use a family of sets Bj(t, x
∗
j ), j = 0, . . . , l. First
we onstrut the set of IDPs for the whole game Γ (x0, T − t0) in the following
way: for eah xed omposition of IDPs βj(t, x
∗
j ) ∈ Bj(t, x∗j ), j = 0, . . . , l we dene
resulting IDP β̂(t, x̂∗).
Denition 7. Resulting IDP β̂(t, x̂∗) is a funtion dened as a ombination of
imputation distribution proedures βj(t, x
∗
j ) ∈ Bj(t, x∗j ) in all trunated ooperative
subgames Γ̄ cj (x
∗





(1− F0(t))β0(t, x∗0), t ∈ [t0, t0 +∆t],
· · ·
(1− Fj(t))βj(t, x∗j ), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t],
· · ·
(1− Fl(t))βl(t, x∗l ), t ∈ [t0 + l∆t, t0 + (l + 1)∆t].
(25)
The set of all possible resulting IDPs β̂(t, x̂∗) (25) for dierent ompositions
βj(t, x
∗
j ) ∈ Bj(t, x∗j ), j = 0, . . . , l we denote by B̂(t, x̂∗).
Using resulting IDP β̂(t, x̂∗) ∈ B̂(t) it is possible to determine a resulting impu-
tation whih an be used as an imputation in the game Γ (x0, T − t0) with Looking
Forward Approah. But the question stands, will the resulting imputation atu-
ally alloate joint ooperative payo along the onditionally ooperative trajetory
x̂∗(t), this fat is proved in Theorem 4.
Denition 8. Resulting imputation ξ̂(x0, T − t0) is a vetor dened in the
following way:








(1− Fj(τ))βj(τ, x∗j (τ))dτ
]
. (26)
Denote by resulting solution Ŵ (x0, T − t0) the set of all resulting imputations
ξ̂(x0, T − t0) omposed by (25), (26). In game models with Looking Forward Ap-
proah we propose to use the set Ŵ as a solution.
Theorem 4. With any ξ̂(x0, T − t0) ∈ Ŵ (x0, T − t0) it is possible to alloate joint
payo of players (9) along the onditionally ooperative trajetory x̂∗(t) during the
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Fig. 4. Combination of IDPs βj(t, x
∗
j ) ∈ Bj(t, x
∗
j ) dened for eah ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) ∈
Wj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t), j = 0, . . . , l determines the random trunated distribution β̂(t, x̂
∗) ∈
B̂(t, x̂∗).






















Proof. To prove this theorem we start from the last random trunated subgame
Γ̄l(x
∗











(1− Fl(τ))hi(x̂∗(τ), û∗(τ))dτ. (28)
Indeed, maximum joint payo in this game is dened by funtion W (l∆t)(t0 +
l∆t, x∗l,0) (11). Aording to the denition of this funtion for ∀t ∈ [t0 + l∆t, T ]:
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However,
W (l∆t)(t0 + l∆t, x
∗





(1− Fl(τ))hi(x̂∗(τ), û∗(τ))dτ, (30)
where ∀t ∈ [t0 + l∆t, T ]. From (29) and (30) it follows that for ∀t ∈ [t0 + l∆t, T ]
(28) holds. Using this result prove that it also holds for random trunated subgame
Γ̄l−1(x
∗











(1− Fl−1(τ))hi(x̂∗(τ), û∗(τ))dτ, (31)
where ∀t ∈ [t0 + (l − 1)∆t, t0 + l∆t]. Similarly as in the game Γ̄l(x∗l,0, t0 + l∆t) for
∀t ∈ [t0 + (l − 1)∆t, t0 + l∆t]





(1− Fl−1(τ))hi(x̂∗(τ), û∗(τ))dτ. (32)
Then it follows that (31) is satised. We need to proeed until the rst random
trunated subgame Γ̄0(x0, t0). This will enables us to ombine results (28), (31) and
show that for ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] (27) holds. This ompletes the proof.
4.1. Time-onsisteny of the Solution Conept
It is easy to see that the resulting solution Ŵ (x0, T − t0) is time-onsistent, but
there is another surprising property of Ŵ (x0, T − t0).
Theorem 5. The resulting solution Ŵ (x0, T − t0) is strong time-onsistent in the
game Γ (x0, T − t0).
Proof. Suppose that in the game Γ (x0, T − t0) players agreed to hoose an im-
putation ξ̂(x0, T − t0) ∈ Ŵ (x0, T − t0). It means that during the game, in eah ran-
dom trunated subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) they agreed on hoosing the imputation
ξj(x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) ∈ Cj(x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t) with orresponding IDP βj(t, x∗j ) ∈ Bj(t, x∗j ),
t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ]. In fat, during the game players use IDP β̂(t, x̂∗) = βj(t, x∗j ) and








(1 − Fj(t))βj(t, x∗j )dt.
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Suppose that in a given time instant t = tbr, where tbr ∈ [t0 + k∆t, T ] in random
trunated subgame Γ̄ ck (x
∗
k,0, t0 + k∆t) players deide to hoose another imputa-
tion ξ′k(x
∗
k(tbr), tbr) from the IDP-ore Ck(x
∗
k(tbr), tbr). Therefore, there exists IDP
β′k(t, x
∗






(1− Fj(t))β′k(t, x∗k)dt. (33)
In this ase, during the game players will alloate ooperative payo aording to





(1− Fk(t))βk(t, x∗k), t ∈ [t0 + k∆t, tbr),
(1− Fk(t))β′k(t, x∗k), t ∈ [tbr, t0 + (k + 1)∆t],
(1− Fj(t))βj(t, x∗j ), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t],
where j 6= k, j = 0, . . . , l. Corresponding resulting imputation will have the following
form:















(1− Fk(t))β′k(t, x∗k)dt. (34)
Sine β′k(t, x
∗
k) ∈ Bk(t, x∗k), t ∈ [tbr, T ] then the resulting IDP β̂′(t, x̂∗) belongs
to B̂(t, x̂∗). Aording to the denition of Ŵ (x0, T − t0), all vetors ξ̂(x0, T − t0)
obtained by the formula (26) using β̂(t, x̂∗) from the set B̂(t, x̂∗) are alled the
resulting solution Ŵ (x0, T − t0) of the game Γ (x0, T − t0). In (34) we onstruted
the imputation ξ̂′(x0, T − t0) with the IDP β̂′(t, x̂∗) from the set B̂(t, x̂∗) and we
saw that the resulting imputation ξ̂′(xt0 , T − t0) belongs to the initial solution
Ŵ (x0, T − t0). That ompletes the proof.
5. Looking Forward Approah with Random Horizon in Cooperative
Extration Game
The following example of the resoure extration game with two players was
onsidered by Jorgensen and Yeung (1999). The problem of time onsisteny in the
onsidered example was studied by David Yeung et. al. (2012). In the previous paper
on Looking Forward Approah (Petrosian and Barabanov, 2017) the same example
for two players was onsidered, but with the new foreast fator. Three ompeti-
tive models were implemented: with the stohasti foreast, with the deterministi
foreast, and without a foreast. In this paper we onsider resoure extration game
with three players with a speial form of ooperative solution desribed in Setion
3.3 and in (Petrosian et al., 2016). An analytial form of harateristi funtion for
eah oalition is derived aording to (Chander and Tulkens, 1995) and presented
below. Furthermore, we apply the Looking Forward Approah with random hori-
zon to the example. In the nal part of the example the strong time onsisteny
property of the onstruted solution onept is demonstrated.
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In the following model we derive the analytial solution to the problem, but
general analytial solution annot be found. In order to apply the Looking Forward
Approah to the general lass of ooperative dierential games we need to solve
two main problems. First problem is to solve (9) subjet to (10) for eah trunated
subgame. Mathematially this is a lassial ontrol problem, there are numerous
methods for solving it. Solving this problem we obtain approximate ooperative
strategies, ooperative trajetories x∗j (t) and orresponding joint payo (9). Seond
problem is the problem of dening of how to alloate ooperative payo between
the players. We need to alulate harateristi funtion (14) for eah trunated
subgame along the ooperative trajetory, to do this we an use oevolutionary
algorithms (Eiben and Smith, 2003) suitable for game theoretial problems. After
alulating harateristi funtions we an determine solution for eah trunated
subgame (for example IDP-ore), then alulate orresponding resulting solution
(26).
5.1. The Original Game
Consider an eonomy endowed with a single renewable resoure, with n ≥ 2
resoure extrators (rms). Let ui(t) denote the quantity of the resoure extrated
by rm i at time t, for i ∈ N , where eah rm ontrols its rate of extration. Let
x(t) ∈ X ⊂ R be the size of the resoure stok at time t. The growth dynamis of






ui, x(t0) = x0, (35)
where a
√
x(t)− bx(t) is the natural rate of evolution of the resoure and ui ∈ [0, d],
d > 0, i = 1, 3.
The extration ost for rm i ∈ N depends on the quantity of the resoure









where ci is onstant and ci 6= ck, ∀i 6= k = 1, 3. We onsider set of parameters x0, T ,
a, b, d, ci, i = 1, 3 suh that it is always non-negative in the orresponding ontrol
problem.
5.2. Random Trunated Subgame
The original game Γ (x0, T − t0) is dened on the time interval [t0, T ]. Suppose
for any t ∈ [t0+ j∆t, t0+(j+1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l players have trunated information
about the struture of the game. It inludes information about dynamial system
and payo funtion on the time interval [t0+j∆t, T j ], where T j is a trunated expo-
nentially distributed random variable with distribution funtion Fj(t) and density
funtion fj(t):
Fj(t) =
1− exp(−λ(t−max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1)))
1− exp(−λ(T −max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1)))
, (37)
fj(t) =
λ exp(−λ(t−max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1)))
1− exp(−λ(T −max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1)))
. (38)
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Exponential distribution is widely used for desribing the time between events in a
Poisson proess. Under the events we an understand the hange in game struture.





, t ∈ [max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1), T ],
0, t ∈ [t0 + j∆t,max(t0 + (j + 1)∆t, tj−1)].
The trunated information is formalized in the random trunated subgame
Γ̄j(xj,0, t0 + j∆t). The dynamial system and the initial onditions for this sub-






ui, x(t0 + j∆t) = xj,0. (39)
Aording to (8) the payo funtion of the extrator i is equal to
Kji (xj,0, t0 + j∆t;u) =
T∫
t0+j∆t
(1 − Fj(τ))hi(x(τ), u(τ))dτ. (40)
Consider the ase when the resoure extrators agree to at ooperatively in the
random trunated subgame Γ̄ cj (xj,0, t0 + j∆t). They follow the optimality priniple
under whih they would maximize their joint payos and share the exess of the
total expeted ooperative payo over the sum of individual non-ooperative payos
proportional to the agents non-ooperative payos.
5.3. Cooperative Trajetory
Next, onsider the random trunated subgame Γ̄j(xj,0, t0+j∆t). The maximized
joint payo in the game Γ̄ cj (xj,0, t0 + j∆t) has the following form (Jorgensen and
Yeung, 1999):
W j∆t(t, x) = Aj(t)
√
x+ Cj(t), (41)





























The optimal ooperative trajetory x∗j (t) of the random trunated subgame
Γ̄ cj (xj,0, t0+ j∆t) an be represented expliitly (Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999) on the
full interval [t0 + j∆t, T ]. The trajetory with the initial ondition x = x
∗
j,0 is
x∗j (t) = ̟
2
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where t ∈ (t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t],
























The initial ondition are dened reursively by the optimal trajetory of the previous




j−1(t0 + j∆t) for j = 0, . . . , l. The onditionally oop-
erative trajetory x̂∗(t) is dened in aordane with Looking Forward Approah
as
x̂∗j (t) = x
∗
j (t), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t], (45)
for j = 0, . . . , l.
5.4. Charateristi Funtion
In order to alloate ooperative payo in eah random trunated subgame it is
neessary to dene values of harateristi funtion Vj(S;xj,0, t0+j∆t) (Vj(S;x
∗
j (t), t))
for eah oalition S ⊂ N . Aording to the formula (14) maximized joint payo
Wj(t0 + j∆t, xj,0) (41) orresponds to the value of harateristi funtion of grand
oalition Vj(N ;xj,0, t0 + j∆t) in the random trunated subgame Γ̄
c
j (xj,0, t0 + j∆t):
Vj(N ;x
∗
j (t), t) =W
j∆t(t, x∗j (t)), (46)
where t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ], j = 0, . . . , l. Next, we need to dene values of harateristi
funtion for the following oalitions:
{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}. (47)
Aording to (14), for a single player oalitions {i}, i = 1, 3 we need to determine
Nash equilibrium point and as a result Vj({i};x∗j(t), t).
5.5. Single Player Coalitions
Random trunated subgame Γ̄j(xj,0, t0 + j∆t) has a Nash equilibrium point
dened by the feedbak






, i = 1, 3, (48)
where funtions Aji (t) are dened by the equations



























for i = 1, 3, with boundary onditions lim
t→T−
Aji (T ) = 0 and lim
t→T−
Cji (T ) = 0.
The value funtion of the extrator i = 1, 3 in the Nash equilibrium point is
equal to




x+ Cji (t), i = 1, 3. (49)
Therefore, value of harateristi funtion for single oalitions S = {i}, i ∈ N an
be alulated in the following way:
Vj({i};x∗j(t), t) = V ji (t, x∗j (t)), (50)
where t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ], j = 0, . . . , l.
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5.6. Two Player Coalitions
Aording to the formula (14) harateristi funtion Vj(S;xj,0, t0+j∆t) (Vj(S;
x∗j (t), t)) for two player oalitions S = {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} is dened as total payo






3 ) in the
game with following set of players: oalition S (ating as one player) and players
from the set N \ S, i.e. in the game with |N \ S| + 1 = 2 players. It means that
players from oalition S behave as one player and other players from the set N \ S
are ating separately. Using this approah we dene Nash equilibrium between two
players: ombined player (oalition S), and the seond player (oalition N/S).
Consider alulations of Vj(S;xj,0, t0+j∆t) in ase when S = {1, 2}, alulations
for other oalitions have the same algorithm. Payo of players in this ase has the
following form:


















































































Therefore, the value of harateristi funtion for oalition S = {1, 2} an be
alulated in the following way:
Vj({1, 2};x∗j(t), t) = V j{1,2}(t, x∗j (t)), (51)
where t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, T ], j = 0, . . . , l.
5.7. IDP-ore
Using the values of harateristi funtion Vj(S;xj,0, t0 + j∆t), ∀S ⊂ N (46),
(50), (51) and formula (20) we onstrut set Bj(t, x
∗
j ) as a set of integrable vetor






(1 − Fj(t))βji (t, x∗j ) = −
d
dt
Vj({1, 2, 3};x∗j(t), t),




















(1− Fj(t))βj3(t, x∗j ) ≥ −
d
dt
Vj({3};x∗j (t), t). (52)
Then, ombining sets Bj(t, x
∗
j ), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l for all
random trunated subgames we onstrut set B̂(t, x̂∗). Further we alulate the set
of all possible imputations ξ̂(x0, T − t0) ∈ Ŵ (x0, T − t0) (26).
The step by step onstrution of the IDP-ore for a linear quadrati game model
of pollution ontrol is presented in the paper (Petrosian et al., 2016).
5.8. Numerial Example
Consider a numerial example, where information about the struture of the
game during the time intervals [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j +1)∆t] is known for next the time
interval with length T j , where T j is a random variable distributed by (37) with
λ = 0.5. The total game length T = 4. Information about the game updates every
∆t = 1. Parameters of the dynamial system are following: a = 10, b = 0.5. Assume
c1 = 0.15, c2 = 0.65, and c3 = 0.45 in the payo funtion and the initial onditions
t0 = 0, x0 = 200. During the realization of the game information horizon take the
following values:
t0 = 2.423, t1 = 3.538, t2 = 3.871, t3 = 4.
Generated values of information horizon inuene the distribution of the time untill
the available trunated information being orret. In Fig. 5 it is easy to see how
the information horizon T j was generated and how the probability density funtion
fj(t) (38) hanges between random trunated subgames.
In Fig. 6-8 we an see ooperative strategies for eah player dened with Looking
Forward Approah with random horizon (non smooth solid line) and ooperative
strategies in the original game in (Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999) (smooth dotted line).
Conditionally ooperative trajetory x̂∗(t) is omposed from solutions of the
random trunated subgames Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t) with the dynamial system (39).
In Fig. 9 the following omparison is presented: onditionally ooperative traje-
tory x̂∗(t) (thik solid line) dened using Looking Forward Approah with random
horizon, onditionally ooperative trajetory x̄∗(t) (thin solid line) dened with las-
sial Looking Forward Approah (Petrosian, 2016a) (where T j = 2 is a determined
value), and ooperative trajetory x∗(t) (dotted line) in the original game Γ (x0, T−
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Fig. 5. Probability density funtion fj(t), j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (38) for eah random trunated
subgame.
Fig. 6. Cooperative strategies for player 1 dened with Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon (non-smooth), and ooperative strategies in the original game in
(Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999) (smooth)
Fig. 7. Cooperative strategies for player 2 dened with Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon (non-smooth), and ooperative strategies in the original game in
(Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999) (smooth)
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Fig. 8. Cooperative strategies for player 3 dened with Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon (non-smooth), and ooperative strategies in the original game in
(Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999) (smooth)
t0). Cooperative trajetory x
∗(t) is dened in (Jorgensen and Yeung, 1999). In the
other two gures you an see onditionally ooperative trajetory x̂∗(t) or x̄∗(t) and
orresponding ooperative trajetories for eah trunated subgame.
Fig. 9. The trajetory of the resoure stok x̂∗(t) (thik solid line) with Looking Forward
Approah with random horizon, trajetory x̄∗(t) (thik dotted line) dened with lassial
Looking Forward Approah, and ooperative trajetory x∗(t) (thin dotted line) in the
original game Γ (x0, T − t0).
Next, in order to alloate ooperative payo between players it is neessary to
dene a set of IDPs βj(t, x
∗





j = 0, . . . , l. For that using xed parameters of the model we numerially alulate
values of harateristi funtion Vj(S;x
∗
j (t), t), S ⊂ N for eah random trunated
subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t).
Using values of harateristi funtion Vj(S;x
∗
j (t), t), S ⊂ N we onstrut the
set Bj(t, x
∗
j ), j = 0, . . . , l (20). By ombination of sets Bj(t, x
∗
j ) we an onstrut set
of IDPs for the whole game B̂(t, x̂∗). On the basis of B̂(t, x̂∗) we onstrut solution
onept Ŵ (x0, T − t0) using formula (26).
Let us demonstrate the property of strong time-onsisteny of solution onept
Ŵ . Suppose that at the beginning of the game Γ (x0, T − t0) players agreed to
use proportional solution. For eah random trunated subgame Γ̄ cj (x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t)
382 Ovanes Petrosian, Sergei Pogozhev
Fig. 10. The trajetory of the resoure stok x̂∗(t) (thik solid line) with Looking Forward
Approah with random horizon, and orresponding ooperative trajetories (dotted lines).
Fig. 11. The trajetory of the resoure stok x̄∗(t) (thik solid line) dened with lassial
Looking Forward Approah, and orresponding ooperative trajetories (dotted line).
proportional solution for players i ∈ N is dened using the IDP in the following
way:
(1 − Fj(t))βPropi,j (t, x∗j ) =
Uj({i};x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t)∑
i∈N
Uj({i};x∗j,0, t0 + j∆t)
Uj(N ;x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t), (53)
where Uj(S;x
∗
j,0, t0 + j∆t), ∀S ⊂ N is dened in (19). Aording to the Looking
Forward Approah proportional solution should alloate ooperative payo during
the whole game Γ (x0, T − t0) using the following IDP:
β̂Prop(t, x̂
∗) = (1− Fj(t))βPropj (t, x∗j ), t ∈ [j∆t, (j + 1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l. (54)
Via integration of β̂Prop(t, x̂
∗) by t it is possible to dene the proportional imputa-
tion ξ̂Prop(x̂
∗(t), T−t) (26). In the Fig. 13,14 it an be seen that β̂Prop(t, x̂∗) onsists
in the set B̂(t, x̂∗), whih means that proportional solution is strong time-onsistent
with given parameters.
Suppose that at the moment of time tbr ∈ [t0, T ] players deide that proportional
solution is no longer fair for them and they hoose another imputation from the
solution onept Ŵ (x̂∗(tbr), T − tbr), for example solution, whih is based upon the
Shapley value for eah random trunated subgames. For eah random trunated
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∗(tbr))− Vj(S\{i}; tbr, x̂∗(tbr))
)
. (55)
Using Shapley value it it possible to dene IDP for eah random trunated subgame
(17). Aording to the Looking Forward Approah proportional solution should
alloate ooperative payo during the whole game using the following IDP:
β̂Sh(t, x̂
∗) = (1− Fj(t))βShj (t, x∗j ), t ∈ [t0 + j∆t, t0 + (j + 1)∆t], j = 0, . . . , l,
where βShj (t, x
∗
j ) is dened using the formula (18). It is worth mentioning that the
IDP for Shapley value βShj (t, x
∗





are alulated in the way to ensure the time-onsisteny property, i.e. using the
formula (18). The extended desription of the step by step solution of IDP for a
Shapley value is presented in (Shevkoplyas, 2009).
Let us set the moment tbr = 1.2 when players deide to reonsider the propor-
tional solution. Then, aording to (25), the formula for the IDP for the whole game




∗), t ∈ [t0, tbr],
β̂Sh(t, x̂
∗), t ∈ (tbr, T ].
(56)
In Fig. 12 IDP β̂Prop(t, x̂
∗) for the proportional solution (54) (thik solid line) and
IDP β̂(t, x̂∗) for the ombined solution (56) (dotted line) are presented.
Fig. 12. IDP β̂Prop(t, x̂
∗) for the proportional solution (53) (thik solid line), IDP β̂(t, x̂∗)
for the ombined solution (56) (dotted line).
Via the diret integration of β̂(t, x̂∗) (56) by t it is possible to dene formula (26)
for resulting alloation ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T − t). Aording to ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T − t), players alloate
ooperative payo in the game Γ (x0, T − t0) in the following way:
ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T − t) = (12.3, 30.2, 16.8). (57)
In Fig. 13,14 it an be seen that β̂(t, x̂∗) (56) is within the set B̂(t, x̂∗) (20), whih
means that orresponding imputation ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T−t) ∈ Ŵ (x̂∗(t), T−t) with given pa-
rameters. This fat demonstrates the property of strong time-onsisteny of solution
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onept
Ŵ (x0, T − t0). Also, in Fig. 13,14 it an be seen that the proportional solution
β̂Prop(t, x̂
∗) (54) is within the set B̂(t, x̂∗).
Fig. 13. Axis: β1, β2, t. β3 an be alulated using (20).
Fig. 14. Axis: β2, β3, t. β1 an be alulated using (20).
In Fig. 15 the dierene between the ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T − t) and ξ̂Prop(x̂∗(t), T − t) is
presented.
6. Conlusion
A novel approah to denition of a solution for a dierential game is presented.
The game is dened on a time interval divided into subintervals. The players do
not have full information about the struture of the game on the full time interval.
Instead, they know parameters of the dynamial system and of the payo funtion,
but the duration of this information is unknown in advane. A ombined trajetory
is omposed reursively by the loal trajetories. As a solution IDP-ore is used.
Solution for the whole game is desribed as a new solution onept. It is proved that
the new solution is not only time-onsistent but also strong time-onsistent whih
is a rare property of ooperative dierential games.
The approah is illustrated by an example of the resoure extration game.
The omparison between the original approah and the Looking Forward Approah
with random horizon is presented. Combined trajetories for both approahes are
presented. Solution onept based on the IDP-ore is onstruted. In the nal part
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Fig. 15. Imputation ξ̂Prop(x̂
∗(t), T − t) for the proportional solution (thik solid line),
imputation ξ̂(x̂∗(t), T − t) for the ombined solution (dotted line).
of the example the strong time onsisteny property of the onstruted solution is
demonstrated. It is supposed that players agreed on using a proportional solution
from the solution set, but at some point they deide to swith to a Shapley value.
As it turns out the resulting solution belongs to the solution set.
Referenes
Eiben, A. E., Smith, J. E. (2003). Introdution to Evolutionary Computing. Berlin,
Springer.
Haurie, A. (1976). A note on nonzero-sum dierential games with bargaining solutions.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Appliations, 18, 3139.
Subbotin, A. I. (1984). Generalization of the main equation of dierential game theory.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Appliations, 43, 103133.
Subbotin, A. I. (1995). Generalized Solutions of First Order PDEs. Basel, Birkhauser.
Cassandras, C. J., Lafortune, S. (2008). Introdution to disrete event systems. New York,
Springer.
Gillies, D. B. (1959). Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. Contributions to the Theory
of Games, 4, 4785.
Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosyan, L.A. (2012). Subgame-onsistent Eonomi Optimization.
New York, Springer.
Gromova, E. V., Petrosian, O. L. (2016). Control of information horizon for ooperative
dierential game of pollution ontrol. 2016 International Conferene Stability and Os-
illations of Nonlinear Control Systems (Pyatnitskiy's Conferene), 14.
Shevkoplyas, E.V. (2009). Time-onsisteny Problem Under Condition of a Random Game
Duration in Resoure Extration. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2,
461473.
Shevkoplyas, E. V. (2010). Stable ooperation in dierential games with random duration.
Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 2(3), 79105.
Shevkoplyas, E.V. (2011). The Shapley value in ooperative dierential games with random
duration. Ann. Dyn. Games. New York, Springer.
Shevkoplyas, E. V. (2014). The Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman Equation for a Class of Dier-
ential Games with Random Duration. Automation and Remote Control, 75, 959970.
Goodwin, G. C., Seron, M.M., Dona, J. A. (2005). Constrained Control and Estimation:
An Optimisation Approah. Springer, New York.
Kuhkarov, I. and O. Petrosian (2019). On Class of Linear Quadrati Non-ooperative
Dierential Games with Continuous Updating. Leture Notes in Computer Siene,
11548, 635650.
386 Ovanes Petrosian, Sergei Pogozhev
Rawlings, J. B., Mayne, D .Q. (2009). Model Preditive Control: Theory and Design.Madi-
son, Nob Hill Publishing.
Petrosjan, L.A. (1993). Strongly time-onsistent dierential optimality priniples. Vestnik
St. Petersburg Univ. Math., 26, 4046.
Petrosjan, L.A., Shevkoplyas, E.V. (2003). Cooperative solutions for games with random
duration. Game Theory Appl., 9, 125139.
Petrosyan, L.A. (1977). Time-onsisteny of solutions in multi-player dierential games.
Vestnik Leningrad State University, 4, 4652.
Petrosyan, L.A., Yeung, D.W.K. (2006). Dynamially stable solutions in randomly-
furating dierential games. Trans. Steklov Inst. Math, 253, 208220.
Petrosyan, L.A., Danilov, N.N. (1979). Stability of solutions in non-zero sum dierential
games with transferable payos. Vestnik Leningrad State University, 1, 5259.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A Value for n-person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games,
2, 307317.
Shapley, L. S. (1952). Notes on the N-Person Game III: Some Variants of the von-
Neumann-Morgenstern Denition of Solution. Rand Corporation researh memoran-
dum RM-817, 112.
Wang, L. (2005). Model Preditive Control System Design and Implementation Using
MATLAB. Springer, New York.
Krasovskii, N.N., Kotel'nikova, A.N. (2010). On a dierential intereption game. Proeed-
ings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematis, 268, 161206.
Petrosian, O. L. (2016). Looking Forward Approah in Cooperative Dierential Games.
International Game Theory Review, 18(2), 114.
Petrosian, O. L. (2016). Looking Forward Approah in Cooperative Dierential Games with
innite-horizon. Vestnik S.-Petersburg Univ. Ser. 10. Prikl. Mat. Inform. Prots. Upr.
4, 1830.
Petrosian, O. L., Barabanov, A. E. (2017). Looking Forward Approah in Cooperative Dif-
ferential Games with Unertain-Stohasti Dynamis. Journal of Optimization Theory
and Appliations, 172(1), 328347.
Petrosian, O., Tur, A. (2019). Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman Equations for Non-ooperative
Dierential Games with Continuous Updating.Mathematial Optimization Theory and
Operations Researh, 178191.
Petrosian, O. L., Gromova, E.V., Pogozhev, S.V. (2016). Strong Time-onsistent Subset
of Core in Cooperative Dierential Games with Finite Time Horizon. Mat. Teor. Igr
Pril., 8(4), 79106.
Petrosian, O., Kuhkarov, I. (2019). About the Looking Forward Approah in Coopera-
tive Dierential Games with Transferable Utility. Frontiers of Dynami Games: Game
Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2018, 175208.
Petrosian, O., Shi, L., Li, Y., Gao, H. (2019). Moving Information Horizon Approah for
Dynami Game Models. Mathematis, 7, 1239.
Petrosian, O. L., Nastyh, M.A., Volf, D.A. (2017). Dierential Game of Oil Market with
Moving Informational Horizon and Non-Transferable Utility. Construtive Nonsmooth
Analysis and Related Topis (dediated to the memory of V.F. Demyanov) (CNSA),
2017, 14.
Chander, P., Tulkens, H. (1995). A ore-theoreti solution for the design of ooperative
agreements on transfrontier pollution. International Tax and Publi Finane, 2(2),
279293.
Bellman, R. (1957). Dynami Programming. Prineton, Prineton University Press.
Jorgensen, S., Yeung, D.W.K. (1999). Inter- and intragenerational renewable resoure
extration. Annals of Operations Researh, 88, 275289.
Jorgensen, S., Martin-Herran, G., Zaour, G. (2003). Agreeability and Time Consisteny
in Linear-State Dierential Games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Appliations,
119, 4963.
Looking Forward Approah with Random Horizon 387
Kostyunin, S. Yu., Shevkoplyas, E. V. (2011). On simpliation of integral payo in dier-
ential games with random duration. Vestnik S.-Petersburg Univ. Ser. 10. Prikl. Mat.
Inform. Prots. Upr. 4, 4756.
Basar, T., Olsder, G. J. (1995). Dynami Nonooperative Game Theory. London, Aademi
Press.
Kwon, W.H., Han, S.H. (2005). Reeding Horizon Control: Model Preditive Control for
State Models. Springer, New York.
Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosian, O.L. (2017). Innite Horizon Dynami Games: A New Ap-
proah via Information Updating. International Game Theory Review, 20(1), 123.
